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Respondents the Executive Director of the Utah Department of
Environmental Quality, the Director of the Utah Division of Air Quality, the Utah
Department of Environmental Quality (UDEQ), and the Utah Division of Air
Quality (UDAQ) (collectively Agency-Respondents) submit this Supplemental
Brief under this Court’s August 5, 2016 Order. Agency-Respondents address three
issues in this Supplemental Brief: (1) the authority for this Court’s jurisdiction to
review the administrative decision in this case; (2) the effect of this Court’s recent
decision in Ellis-Hall Consultants v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 2016 UT
34, on the standard of review applicable to pure questions of law; and (3) the
application of Ellis-Hall to the standard of review for mixed questions of law and
fact.
This appeal arises from the Agency-Respondents’ permitting decision,
interpreting and applying technical statutes and rules to a technical set of facts. The
final permit regulates an expansion and modernization project at the Holly Refinery
in Davis County that underwent multiple layers of review, including rigorous public
comment (almost 4,000 pages of comments submitted), review and response to
comments by the agency, and subsequent administrative appeal.

1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals certified this case to the Utah Supreme Court on
August 4, 2016. See Order (Aug. 4, 2016). The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to
review a “dispositive action in a permit review adjudicative proceeding” under Utah
Code Sections 19-1-301.5(14) (West 2014), 1 amended by 2015 Utah Laws Ch. 379
(S.B. 282), 63G-4-403 (West 2016), and 78A-4-103(2)(a)(i)(B) (West 2014),
amended by 2015 Utah Laws Ch. 441 (S.B. 173). The dispositive action is the
Executive Director’s Order Adopting Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Recommended Order on the Merits dated March 31, 2015. The Utah Supreme
Court has jurisdiction to review this dispositive action under the same statutory
authority.
ARGUMENT
I.

A Narrow Application of Ellis-Hall May be Appropriate in this Case on
Review of Pure Questions of Law
In a series of recent decisions, this Court has sought to reconcile conflicting

precedents and eliminate any lingering uncertainty regarding appellate standards of
review. In particular, this Court recently decided Ellis-Hall, 2016 UT 34, addressing
1

All citations to Section 19-1-301.5 in this Supplemental Brief refer to the 2014
pre-amended version of the statute because it governs this case. See Br. of Resp’t
Dep’t of Envtl. Quality et al. (DEQ Br.), Appeal No. 20150344-CA at 3, n.2 (Oct.
28, 2015).
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the standard of appellate review under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
(UAPA) of an agency’s determinations of pure questions of law. Ellis-Hall
repudiated “prior decisions calling for deference to an agency’s interpretation of its
own orders or regulatory enactments[,]” id. ¶ 28, and held that “agency decisions
premised on pure questions of law are subject to non-deferential review for
correctness.” Id. ¶ 27.
The Agency-Respondents recognize that this language is broad and may
determine this Court’s review of the pure questions of law in this case despite a
provision in Utah Code, Section 19-1-301.5 that strongly implies a clearly
erroneous standard of review. See Utah Code Ann. § 19-1-301.5(14)(c).
Specifically, Section 19-1-301.5(14)(c) directs the appellate court to review all
agency determinations under UAPA Subsection 63G-4-403(4), at the same time
“recognizing that the agency has been granted substantial discretion to interpret its
governing statutes and rules . . . .” Id. Even though only a few purely legal
questions are implicated in this appeal, a broad application of Ellis-Hall would
potentially nullify Section 19-1-301.5(14)(c) and have a precedential effect on cases
arising under Section 19-1-301.5.
The Agency-Respondents submit that examining Ellis-Hall and the cases it
relied on, specifically Murray v. Utah Labor Commission, 2013 UT 38, 308 P.3d
3

461, and Hughes General Contractors v. Utah Labor Commission, 2014 UT 3, 322
P.3d 712, may support a narrower interpretation of this Court’s holding in EllisHall for at least three reasons: (1) the legislature has expressly directed the appellate
courts to recognize the substantial discretion it granted to Agency-Respondents (in
contrast to Ellis-Hall and a line of cases it abrogated where discretion was inferred
from an agency’s statute or a regulation an agency was interpreting); (2) the
legislative grant of discretion to the Agency-Respondents serves an important
purpose because not only factual but also legal questions in permit review cases are
technical; and (3) Agency-Respondents are not in a dual capacity of making and
interpreting the law (i.e. the power to make and interpret the law is not concentrated
in the hands of the same agency).
A.

The Legislature Has Expressly Directed the Appellate Courts to
Recognize the Substantial Discretion Granted to the AgencyRespondents
Section 19-1-301.5(14)(c) expressly directs the appellate courts to recognize

the discretion afforded to the Agency-Respondents on interpretation of their
governing statutes and rules. Ellis-Hall and the cases it relied on to support its
reasoning and holding—Murray and Hughes—involved a different statutory
framework where the discretion was inferred from a statute an agency was
interpreting. In Murray, the Utah Labor Commission applied the Utah Workers’
4

Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401, which did not expressly or
impliedly delegate any discretion to the Commission. Murray, 2013 UT 38, ¶ 8.
Instead, the Court of Appeals inferred discretion from a different statutory
provision—Section 34A-1-301, which granted the Commission the authority to
determine the facts and apply the laws it administers. Id. ¶ 25 (quoting Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-1-301) (“The commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction,
and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in this chapter or any other
title or chapter it administers.”). This Court reversed the Court of Appeals, drawing
a clear distinction between the authority to determine the facts and apply the law
and the discretion to do so, concluding that mere authority does not justify an abuse
of discretion standard of review under UAPA. See Murray, 2013 UT 38, ¶ 28.
In the present case, Section 19-1-301.5 does not grant authority to AgencyRespondents to interpret their governing statutes and rules. Instead, the statute
directs the appellate courts to recognize during judicial review that the legislature
has granted the agency substantial discretion to interpret its governing statutes and
rules. See Utah Code Ann. § 19-1-301.5(14)(c). This strongly implies an abuse of
discretion standard of review.
Despite this statutory language, Murray suggests that “discretion” and
“deference” are two distinct concepts and the lower tribunal “does not have
5

discretion to reach anything other than the ‘right’ answer” when interpreting
questions of law. See also Hughes, 2014 UT 3, ¶ 25 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (“Statutory interpretation does not present such a discretionary decision,
because questions of law . . . ha[ve] a single right answer.”). In other words, if
Murray’s reasoning is extended to this case, the grant of discretion in Section 19-1301.5 becomes a legal nullity because there is only one right answer that the courts
have the same, if not better, ability to ascertain on pure questions of law.
This result seems to conflict with clear statutory intent and Murray’s own
recognition that in some instances a statute prescribes a standard of review that the
appellate courts must apply in lieu of the traditional approach. See Murray, 2013
UT 38, ¶ 22 (“In some instances . . . section 63G-4-403 will have characterized the
action in such a way that the applicable standard of review will be obvious.”). This
exception is also recognized in Ellis-Hall, where it acknowledges that “deference to
agencies is limited to circumstances prescribed by statute or required by our
caselaw . . . .” Ellis-Hall, 2016 UT 34, ¶ 26. This Court also often observes that a
statute may be ambiguous and there may be more than one reasonable
interpretation. See e.g., LeBeau v. State, 2014 UT 39, ¶ 26, 337 P.3d 254
(recognizing that a statutory language may remain ambiguous and susceptible to
two or more reasonable interpretations); State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 22, 356
6

P.3d 1258 (quoting State v. Watkins, 2013 UT 28, ¶ 24, 309 P.3d 209) (“A statute is
ambiguous when ‘its terms remain susceptible to two or more reasonable
interpretations after we have conducted a plain language analysis.’”).
A limited reading of Ellis-Hall is also consistent with this Court’s decision in
Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, 2012 UT 73, ¶
10, 289 P.3d 558, where the legislature similarly had granted the Board of Oil, Gas,
and Mining “explicit authority and wide latitude in interpreting the operative
provisions of the Mining Act” and prescribed a specific standard of review under
Utah Code Section 40-10-30(3). Accordingly, the Court recognized that while it
reviewed an agency’s “general interpretations of law for correctness” under UAPA,
it could set aside the Board’s “legal conclusions and interpretations of the Mining
Act only if those conclusions were ‘based upon a clearly erroneous interpretation or
application of the law.’” Sierra Club, 2012 UT 73, ¶ 10 (quoting Utah Code Ann. §
40-10-30(3)(e) (emphasis added)).
Even though Sierra Club was decided prior to Murray, Hughes, and EllisHall, none of those cases expressly overruled Sierra Club’s application of the
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deferential standard of review to the Board’s Mining Act interpretations,
presumably because the standard was statutorily prescribed.2
B.

The Legal Questions in This Case are Technical and Discretion May
be Warranted
Additionally, the appellate courts may not be in a better position to interpret

the agency’s own governing statutes and rules in this particular case due to the
technical nature of both legal and factual questions. This contrasts with Hughes,
where an agency interpreted a state statute by relying on federal case law, which
was ambiguous and involved application of the Chevron deference doctrine. See
Hughes, 2014 UT 3, ¶¶ 20-21, 24; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
This Court disagreed with the agency’s interpretation, holding that reliance
on federal cases was not a viable approach under Utah law because the state law did

2

Notably, although not identical, Section 19-1-301.5 and Section 40-10-30 are
similar in important ways. Section 40-10-30 incorporates UAPA provisions for
judicial review of an agency’s adjudicative proceedings in subsection (1) and at the
same time prescribes several specific standards of review in subsection (3). Section
19-1-301.5 incorporates UAPA (“the appellate court shall . . . review all agency
determinations in accordance with Subsection 63G-4-403(4)”) and strongly implies
a specific standard of review (the appellate court must conduct its review while
“recognizing that the agency has been granted substantial discretion to interpret its
governing statutes and rules . . .”). Utah Code § 19-1-301.5(14)(c). This statutory
language suggests an abuse of discretion standard of review.
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not defer to the federal regulations and cases relying on those regulations, Hughes,
2014 UT 3, ¶ 8, and no Chevron-like standard of administrative deference applied.
Id. ¶ 25. Consequently, the appellate court was “in as good of a position as the
agency to interpret” the statutory language due to its similar, if not better, ability to
engage in statutory construction of a general statute. Ellis-Hall, 2016 UT 34, ¶ 32.
In the present case, the statutory and regulatory provisions that the Court is required
to review are technical and involve agency-specific expertise in contrast to “general
interpretations of law.” See Hughes, 2014 UT 3, ¶ 25, n.5 Consequently, in Section
19-1-301.5(14)(c), the legislature chose to expressly direct the appellate courts to
recognize the agency’s substantial discretion in interpreting its governing statutes
and rules.
C.

The Agency-Respondents are not Lawmakers; Instead the Air
Quality Board is the Lawmaking Arm of the Agency and is not
Involved in Adjudicatory Decision-Making
The Public Service Commission’s unique and dual role as a lawmaker and

tribunal was yet another reason for this Court’s holding in Ellis-Hall. There the
Court reviewed a decision by the Commission that interpreted the Commission’s
own prior orders and a regulatory provision. Ellis-Hall, 2016 UT 34, ¶¶ 2-16. The
Court reversed the Commission’s interpretation and held that the Commission was
owed no deference on pure questions of law. See id. ¶ 21. The Court reasoned that it
9

“may be in a better position” than the agency to interpret the law because the
agency itself was in the “position of lawmaker” in issuing the orders and regulation
pursuant to the authority given to it by the legislature. Id. ¶ 32. The Court was
concerned that if it deferred to the Commission’s interpretations, it would place the
power to write the law and the power to authoritatively interpret the law in the same
hands. See id.
Here, Agency-Respondents do not have the same convergence of power both
to write and interpret the law. The Utah Legislature enacted the statutes under
which the agency operates, and UDAQ’s regulations are promulgated by the Air
Quality Board through notice-and-comment rulemaking. Utah Code Ann. § 19-2106 (West 2016). The discretion afforded UDEQ is also not inferred from these
specific regulations but instead is expressly granted by the legislature in Section 191-301.5.
II.

Ellis-Hall Does Not Impact Review of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact
in This Case
Ellis-Hall also may raise a question as to this Court’s review of mixed

questions of law and fact. In Murray, this Court reasoned that “the question of
whether a set of facts falls within a legal standard is itself a question of law” that
“has a single ‘right’ answer in terms of the trajectory of the law.” Murray, 2013 UT
38, ¶ 33 (internal citation omitted). Ellis-Hall appears to hold that an agency’s
10

interpretations of purely legal questions are not discretionary and are reviewed for
correctness. Ellis-Hall, 2016 UT 34, ¶ 27. However, if, under Murray, mixed
questions are at their core questions of law, and if agencies have no discretion to
reach anything other than the “right answer” in the context of mixed questions, then
under Murray, Hughes, and Ellis-Hall, the legal component of a mixed question is
also reviewed for correctness.
However, Murray also acknowledges that the court is not always in the best
position to determine the “right” answer, and “sometimes afford[s] deference to a
trial court’s decision as a matter of institutional competency.” Id. However, in EllisHall the Court did not review mixed questions; and Agency-Respondents do not
read Ellis-Hall to overrule any part of Murray or its successor case—Sawyer v.
Department of Workforce Services, 2015 UT 33, 345 P.3d 1253.
Sawyer relies in part on Murray to establish the framework for judicial
review of agency determinations of mixed questions. See Sawyer, 2015 UT 33, ¶11.
In particular, Sawyer states that this Court now applies a “binary method for
determining the appropriate standard of review for mixed questions.” Id. The
analytical framework requires that “[l]aw-like mixed questions are reviewed de
novo, while fact-like mixed questions are reviewed deferentially.” Id. To determine
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whether a question is law-like or fact-like, the court applies the three-factor Levin
test. Id. ¶ 12.
The Levin factors are:
(1) the degree of variety and complexity in the facts to which the legal
rule is to be applied; (2) the degree to which a trial court’s application
of the legal rule relies on facts observed by the trial judge, such as a
witness’s appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the
law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to
appellate courts; and (3) other policy reasons that weigh for or against
granting discretion to trial courts.
State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 25, 144 P.3d 1096. Given the fact-intensive nature of
the mixed questions at issue in this case, application of Levin factors (1) and (3)
weigh in favor of fact-like deferential review. The factual record is voluminous and
technical, and the legislature has expressed its policy preference by requiring the
administrative law judges (ALJs) appointed to preside over permit review
adjudicative proceedings to meet certain statutory qualifications. Utah Code Ann. §
19-1-301(5) (West 2016).
According to Sawyer, the second factor weighs in favor of deferential review
where “[d]istrict courts and fact-finding administrative bodies are in a superior
position to weigh facts that depend upon credibility determinations, the direct
observation of witness testimony, and other evidence not fully captured in a written
appellate record.” Sawyer, 2015 UT 33, ¶ 13. However, Sawyer also indicates that
12

the fact-finding role of a lower tribunal is not conclusive as to whether a mixed
question is fact-like. Citing Murray, Sawyer states that although “the second Levin
factor may weigh in favor of de novo review where the facts are not at issue
because the lower tribunal is not required to evaluate witness credibility or
demeanor,” in some cases “the other two Levin factors may weigh more heavily in
favor of deferential review of a given mixed question.” Id. ¶ 23.
Should this Court decide that the grant of discretion in 19-1-301.5 (14)(c) is
inapplicable to the UDEQ’s Final Order and review the agency’s legal questions for
correctness, a deferential standard of review should apply to review of the agency’s
fact-like mixed questions. Although the ALJ does not evaluate witness credibility,
he or she must review a technical, fact-intensive record, and must undertake a
complicated review to determine whether a given set of technical and scientific
facts meet certain legal standards. Accordingly, the agency is in the “best position
to determine the right answer” and judicial review should weigh in favor of
deferential review of the agency’s fact-like mixed questions in this case. See
Murray, 2013 UT 38, ¶ 33.
Finally, this Court decided Sawyer after Hughes, and both cases rely on
Murray. However, Ellis-Hall does not cite Sawyer, presumably because Ellis-Hall
did not present a mixed question for review. To the degree that this Court intends
13

Ellis-Hall to resolve the question of judicial review of agency interpretations in
favor of de novo review, UDEQ respectfully submits that Ellis-Hall does not affect
the analysis of mixed questions in Sawyer, which permit deferential review of factlike agency determinations such as those at issue in this case.
III.

Even if This Court Reviews Agency-Respondents’ Interpretation of
Their Governing Statutes and Rules for Correctness, AgencyRespondents Correctly Interpreted the Law
If this Court decides to extend Ellis-Hall’s holding to questions of law and

mixed questions of law and fact that are more law-like and review them for
correctness, there are only a few issues that fall under these categories:
1.

Whether UDEQ was required by law to use the AP-42 emission

factors to estimate particulate matter emissions. See DEQ Br. at II.A.2
through A.4.
2.

Whether UDEQ was allowed to use historical emissions

inventory data for the propane pit flare in its netting analysis. See id. at II.B.
3.

Whether UDEQ must include upset emissions in potential-to-

emit (PTE) calculations for refinery flares or in NAAQS modeling. See id. at
III.A.1, pp. 44-45 (upset emissions), pp. 48-52 (modeling).
4.

Whether UDEQ must include short-term emissions limits in an

approval order for a minor modification. See id. at III.A.1, p. 45.
14

5.

Whether the full text of Subpart Ja must be included in an

approval order. See id. at III.B.
Petitioners in this case have not offered any reasonable interpretations of the
applicable laws, simply disagreeing with the application of the laws to the facts of
this case. Consequently, this Court’s conclusions under the correctness standard of
review will similarly affirm the administrative decisions below.
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of October 2016.

SEAN D. REYES
Utah Attorney General

/s/ Christian C. Stephens
Craig W. Anderson
Christian C. Stephens
Marina V. Thomas
Assistant Attorneys General
Utah Attorney General’s Office
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